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Abstract
This paper investigates a new auction model in which bidders have both copy and budget constraints. This new model has
extensive and interesting applications in auctions of online ad-words, software licenses, etc. We consider the following problem:
Supposing all participators are rational, how does one allocate the objects and at what price so as to maximize the auctioneer’s
revenue.
We introduce new kinds of mechanisms called auctioneer-advantaged mechanisms and present the notion of unconditional
competitive auctions. A notably interesting property of auctioneer-advantaged mechanisms is that each bidder’s self-interested
strategy brings better utility not only to himself but also to the auctioneer. Then we present auctioneer-advantaged mechanisms
for multi-unit auctions with copy and budget constraints. We prove that these auctions are unconditional competitive under the
situation of both limited and unlimited supply.
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, great progress has been made in electronic commerce, especially in internet auctions, upon which
various theoretical and practical studies have been conducted. Additionally, governments use auctions to sell rights
and assets, such as the Federal Communication Commission. Many companies also use internet auctions to conduct
business; there even exist some companies whose revenue depends almost entirely on certain types of auctions. Over
98% of Google’s revenue and 50% of Yahoo!’s revenue is derived from sales via keywords advertising auctions [6].
In this paper, we study quite general yet rather practical types of auctions, where both budget and copy constraints
are present. In our model, a single seller sells multiple copies of a single kind of digital good. During the process,
each buyer reports one private unit value he is willing to pay for one item, one private number of copies he demands
and one private budget that he is able to pay. We investigate the model from the perspective of the seller. Following
the basic assumption that buyers are rational and want to maximize their utilities, our aim is to present some auctions,
whose performance can be theoretically guaranteed, that maximize the seller’s revenue.
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Different from traditional models which shield complex factors by making certain assumptions, there are some
additional considerations that distinguish our model in terms of real life applicability:
1. Our model is especially suitable for digital goods, which can produce unlimited copies with marginal cost zero,
such as license sales, mp3 copies, online advertisements, etc.
2. We consider both copy and budget constraints. We argue that under most realistic circumstances, the demand of a
buyer is limited. Redundant allocation will bring not profit, but resource waste. For example, issuing 1000 copies
of a software license to a company with only 100 computers is no doubt an undesirable allocation result.
Besides studying the new auction model, this paper also has the following contributions:
• We introduce a new kind of mechanism called auctioneer-advantaged mechanisms. As we know, in two-sided
markets the famous VCG mechanisms maximize the buyers’ utilities and contrarily minimize the sellers’ revenue.
Interestingly, in our auctioneer-advantaged mechanisms, each buyer’s self-interested strategy brings better utility
not only to himself but also to the seller.
• The concept of competitive ratio was first introduced by [8]. However, [8]’s competitive ratio is only available
to mechanisms with dominant strategy. We generalize the concept to unconditional competitive ratio, which is
applicable to more mechanisms.
• For the models with both limited and unlimited supply goods, we present two auctioneer-advantaged mechanisms
with unconditional competitive ratio.
For auctions with constraints, all the previous papers only consider budget constraint. [3,11,13] study the model of
one item to sell under the Bayesian–Nash budget constraint. In the last two years, [2,1] have begun to study the model
of multiple units, multiple bidders with budget constraint. There are three essential differences between our auctions
with both copy and budget constraints and those without copy constraint.
1. Auctions with budget constraint are a special case of auctions with both copy and budget constraints. When budget
tends to become infinite, they are equivalent.
2. In all the existing literature the budget constraint is hard: the bidder will not spend more than the budget under any
situation. In addition, the bidder’s budget is independent of the unit price. However, the copy constraint is not a
hard constraint. Bidders may submit larger copy demands to the auctioneer. And in auctions with both copy and
budget constraints, although the copy demand submitted by a bidder is independent of the unit price, the number of
copies that a bidder can afford is dependent on not only the budget, but also the unit price. This makes the analysis
quite different and much more complicated than the analysis of auctions with budget constraint only.
3. For the auctions with budget constraint only, all the previous work have only studied the limited supply case. If
the supply becomes unlimited, the problem is trivial. For example, in order to maximize the auctioneer’s revenue,
obviously, the best method is to let the unit price become small enough to use up every bidder’s budget. Then the
auctioneer’s revenue is equal to the sum of all bidders’ budget, while the unit price may be close to zero. However,
if we add copy constraint here, the unlimited supply model will be more practical and meaningful.
Our framework is inspired by the work of [7,1]. Specifically, [7] studies auctions with unlimited supply of digital
goods. Each buyer in that model wants at most one copy without any constraint. [1] studies auctions with limited
supply. But the buyers have budget constraints and their demands are unlimited. Since our model allows both unlimited
and limited supply of goods and each buyer’s bid consists of three parameters, clearly our model is substantially
complicated and extends functionally further than these previous models. There are many unique properties of our
model requiring delicate mechanism designs and proofs. Although the basic idea in this paper is similar to that in Fiat,
Goldberg, Hartline and Karlin’s paper, we develop their mechanism such that it can be adapted to our general model.
Most importantly, the analysis of our new mechanisms is totally different from that in their paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formally give the definitions of the concepts and the model.
Section 3 describes an auctioneer-advantaged mechanism for an unlimited supply model with copy constraint. In
Section 4, we prove its equilibria. Section 5 proves the unconditional competitive ratio of the auction. In Section 6, we
generalize the model to limited supply with copy and budget constraints. Furthermore, we present another auctioneer-
advantaged mechanism for this model with unconditional competitive ratio. Finally, we conclude with Section 7.
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2. Preliminaries
2.1. Auctioneer-advantaged mechanisms and unconditional competitive ratio
Before giving its definition, it is necessary for us to introduce some basic knowledge of mechanism design first.
We follow the assumption in economics that all agents are rational, i.e., each of them chooses its strategy to maximize
its own utility selfishly.
A standard model for mechanism design is as follows. Assume there are n agents, and that each agent i has its
private value ti (termed its true type) which is only known to itself. Furthermore, each agent i is given a set of
strategies Ai such that agent i can perform any strategy ai ∈ Ai . For any input vector (a1, . . . , an), the mechanism
M(O, {P1, . . . ,Pn}) should provide an output function o = O(a1, . . . , an) for all agents and a payment function
pi = Pi (a1, . . . , an) for each agent. All the output function and payment functions are open to the public. In a
specific mechanism, if pi ≥ 0, agent i needs to pay pi , as often happens in auctions. If pi < 0, pi is the money given
to agent i . Without loss of generality, we will always assume pi ≥ 0 for any i in the context of auctions in this paper.
For any output, each agent i’s preference is given by a valued function: vi (ti , o), called its valuation. Then its (quasi
linear) utility can be defined as ui (ti , o) = vi (ti , o) − Pi (a1, . . . , an). Accordingly, the auctioneer’s revenue should
be
∑n
i=1 Pi (a1, . . . , an).
One of the most famous mechanisms is called the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism, from Vickrey [16],
Clarke [5], and Groves [9]. Although the VCG mechanism has the attractive virtue that it is incentive compatible,
namely, each agent maximizes its utility when it reports its true type, it also has several weaknesses; for instance, the
revenue may be very low, even zero. Actually, for a two-sided market in which a product with large, indivisible units
is exchanged for money, VCG mechanisms maximize the buyers’ payoff and contrarily minimize the sellers’ revenue
[15,12], which results from the attractive dominant strategy property.
In this paper, we develop new kinds of mechanisms called auctioneer-advantaged mechanisms, in which each
agent’s self-interest motivated strategy brings better utility not only to himself, but also to the auctioneer. Before
introducing the rigorous definition, we first generalize the assumption in dominant strategy to strategic behavior with
multi-dimensional types.
Assumption 2.1. If, for every bidder i , bidding his true valuation in some dimension would maximize his payoff,
regardless of the bids submitted by the other bidders, he will bid such dimensional type truthfully.
Clearly, dominant strategy is a one-dimensional Nash equilibrium satisfying the above assumption.
Definition 2.2 (Auctioneer-Advantaged Mechanisms). In the auctioneer-advantaged mechanism, for any Nash
equilibrium (a∗1 , . . . , a∗n) satisfying the above assumption, the auctioneer’s revenue must be
n∑
i=1
Pi (a∗1 , . . . , a∗n) ≥
n∑
i=1
Pi (t1, . . . , tn).
So under any equilibrium state of an auctioneer-advantaged mechanism, the auctioneer’s revenue must be at least
as high as that when all the agents tell the truth.
In accord with the notion of auctioneer-advantaged mechanisms, we generalize the concept of competitive ratio
for auctions that first appeared in Goldberg et al.’s paper [8] as follows.
Definition 2.3 (Unconditional Competitive Ratio). An auction A has some unconditional competitive ratio β, if, for
any set of rational bidders and their private true value vector b,
RevenueA(b∗) ≥ F(b)
β
,
where b∗ is any Nash equilibrium satisfying Assumption 2.1 in the auction, RevenueA represents the (expected)
revenue of auctionA and F(b) denotes the optimal single price revenue that the auctioneer could have obtained if the
true types of the bidders were known in advance.
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2.2. Auctions with copy constraint: Model and notation
In our model, the auctioneer sells an idiosyncratic commodity with unlimited copies to n buyers, denoted by
i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Each buyer i has two kinds of privately known information: ui ∈ R+, ci ∈ N. ui represents the unit
value buyer i is willing to pay for the commodity, and ci represents the number of copies i demands.
Each buyer i simultaneously submits his bid, denoted by (ui , ci ), to the auctioneer. When receiving all the submitted
bids, the auctioneer decides how many copies each buyer will get and how much he should pay. Actually, it is a one-
round sealed-bid auction.
We use F to represent the optimal revenue the auctioneer could get if the true types of the bidders were known in
advance, under the consideration that the auctioneer can only set an identical unit price. Formally,
Definition 2.4. Given bids b = ((u1, c1), . . . , (un, cn)) sorted in decreasing order according to the unit value,
F(b) = max
1≤k≤n
uk
∑
1≤i≤k
ci (2.1)
denotes the maximum single price revenue the auctioneer can achieve, and such corresponding price uk is denoted by
pF(b).
Furthermore, we use F (2)(b) to represent the optimal single price revenue given that there are at least 2 winners.
That is,
F (2)(b) = max
2≤k≤n
uk
∑
1≤i≤k
ci .
Definition 2.5 (Utility). Each buyer i’s utility for his allocation allocationi and payment paymenti is defined as
Ui = ui ×min{ci ,allocationi } − paymenti , (2.2)
where ui , ci are bidder i’s true type and allocationi is the copies he gets corresponding to his submitted bid.
In addition, for convenience and simplicity, we will use the following notations in the entire paper.
Definition 2.6. Given bidders’ true type vector b,
B = {(ui , ci )|ui ≥ pF(b)} (2.3)
denotes the set of winners whose unit values are not lower than pF(b). And
α =
max
ui≥pF(b)
{ci }∑
ui≥pF(b)
ci
(2.4)
denotes the ratio of maximum demanded copies among winners to the number of demanded copies of all the winners
in the single-price optimal auction.
3. Algorithm: Random Partition with Revenue Share Auction
In the following, based on the bidders’ input vector, we present an auctioneer-advantaged auction with uncondi-
tional competitive ratio called Random Partition with Revenue ShareAuction to obtain the allocation and the payment.
It is inspired by the Cost Sharing Mechanism in [7]. But due to the differences of our model and input vector, some
properties of the Cost Sharing Mechanism are unavailable. We shall develop a new and technically involved analysis
for it.
Definition 3.1. Given bids b = ((u1, c1), . . . , (un, cn)) and R, find the smallest p ∈ R+ such that
p = R∑
ui≥p
ci
;
such p is denoted by pR. When the smallest p such that p = R∑
ui≥p ci
does not exist, p = +∞.
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Obviously, such p can be determined in O(n) time.
Auction 1 RevenueShareR Auction
1: Calculate pR.
2: For any winner i such that ui ≥ pR, sell ci copies to bidder i at unit price pR.
3: Other bidders lose.
Lemma 3.2. Bidders will tell their true unit values in a RevenueShareR Auction.
Proof. For any bids b and revenue R, the corresponding unit price is pR. Here for simplicity, we just use p instead of
pR.
Suppose ∀i , (ui , ci ) is bidder i ′s true value. Now assume bidder j submits his true unit value to the auctioneer and
all other bidders may lie on unit values or copy demands, i.e., b = ((u′1, c′1), . . . , (u j , c′j ), . . . , (u′n, c′n)). We want to
prove that, for bidder j , bidding his true unit value will always maximize his payoff.
Case 1: If j is a loser, his true unit value u j must be lower than p, and his utility is zero when he tells the truth.
His utility will be changed only when he becomes a winner. If j submits u′j instead of u j and becomes a winner
with positive utility, then there must exist p′ ≤ u j < p such that p′(∑u′i≥p′,i 6= j c′i + c′j ) ≥ R, which contradicts the
definition of p which is the smallest.
Case 2: If j is a winner, since p is the smallest as defined, whenever u′j > p, his payment is still p and there is no
change on his utility. When u′j < p, he will become a loser and his utility will be zero.
Therefore, bidders will tell their true unit values. 
The following auction is based on Auction 1.
Auction 2 Random Partition with Revenue Share Auction (RPRS)
1: Partition bids b uniformly at random into two bid sets S′ and S′′.
2: Compute F(S′) and F(S′′).
3: Run RevenueShareF(S′) on S′′. If there are no winners, run RevenueShareF(S′′) on S′.
Theorem 3.3. Bidders will tell their true unit values in a Random Partition with Revenue Share Auction.
Proof. Assume F(S′′) ≤ F(S′). If bidder i is in set S′′, then he is a loser now. If he wants to become a winner, the
only way is to submit u′i > ui . However, this will result in p′ > ui ; otherwise, the optimal revenue of set S′′ could be
larger than F(S′) initially. In this case, bidder i’s utility Ui < 0. If i is in set S′, let R = F(S′′) and we quickly get
that i will tell true unit values by Lemma 3.2. 
We have proved that bidders will tell their true unit values in an RPRS Auction. Then will they tell their true copies?
Assume all bidders are rational; then they will lie on copies as long as they can get more benefit. Suppose there are
three bidders in an RPRS Auction and their true bids are (1, 1), (1.1, 1), (0.54, 1). Now the expected utility of the first
bidder is 0.43. However, if he bids (1, 2) instead of (1, 1), his expected utility will increase to 0.45. In the next section,
we will further study this issue.
4. Nash equilibrium and copy bounds of an RPRS Auction
Consider the counter example above, which implies that in an RPRS Auction a bidder may have motivation to lie
on the number of copies.
In that example, if the first bidder wants to obtain more profit, he has to increase his input number of copies.
Although this change results in a waste of copies, he may attain more profit as long as the new price is low enough.
We assume that bidders choose their input number of copies to maximize their expected utilities given the bids
made by the other bidders. If there exists an equilibrium, then in the equilibrium, each bidder will not change his bid,
which motivates the following definition.
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Definition 4.1. In an RPRS Auction, a Nash equilibrium is a set of input parameters such that for any bidder i and his
strategy c∗i in the equilibrium, there does not exist c′i such that
ui min
{
ci ,allocation∗i
}− p∗ × allocation∗i < ui min {ci ,allocation′i}− p′ × allocation′i ,
where ci is bidder i’s true copy demand, p∗ is the price under the equilibrium while p′ is the unit price when i bids
c′i . allocation
∗
i is the copies that i gets under the equilibrium and allocation
′
i is the copies that i gets when he bids c
′
i .
Lemma 4.2. In a RevenueShareR Auction, a bidder will never tell a smaller number of copies than his true copy
demand.
Proof. For simplicity, here pR is denoted by p. Assume ci is bidder i’s true copy demand. In the
RevenueShareR Auction, it is obvious that a loser will still be a loser if he submits a smaller number of copies. Now
we assume that bidder i is a winner who obtains ci copies. If he submits a smaller number of copies c′i < ci , then
p′ > p. Possibly he becomes a loser and his utility becomes zero. If he is still a winner, he gets fewer copies with
higher unit price. According to Definition 2.5, here Ui = (ui − p) × ci , U ′i = (ui − p′) × ci ′. Then, Ui > U ′i , since
p′ > p, ci ′ < ci . So his utility will become smaller.
Therefore, a rational bidder will never tell a smaller number of copies than his true copy demand. 
Theorem 4.3. In RPRS, a bidder will never tell a smaller number of copies than his true copy demand.
Proof. As we know, in RPRS we partition all bidders into two sets S′ and S′′. Assume F(S′) > F(S′′). If bidder i is
in set S′, then from the above lemma, bidder i will not tell a smaller number of copies. If bidder i is in set S′′, his bid
of a smaller number of copies will make him still be a loser. 
Suppose bidders are sorted in decreasing order according to the unit value. We denote the set of all bidders except
i’s input vectors by b−i =
(
(u1, c′1), . . . , (ui−1, c′i−1), (ui+1, c′i+1), . . . , (un, c′n)
)
. bi = (ui , ci ) is bidder i’s true
type. In a RevenueShareR Auction, we use pR to represent the price corresponding to the input vector (bi ,b−i ). Now,
suppose bidder i changes his copy demand to c′i and we use p′R to represent the new price. In order to increase his
utility, bidder i may lie on his copy demand. Then by how much could bidder i lie on his copies? The following will
answer this question by giving the bounds.
Lemma 4.4. In a RevenueShareR Auction, if bidder i wants to benefit from increasing his copy demand, his cheating
must make at least one loser after him become a winner.
Proof. Assume there are totally n bidders in a RevenueShareR Auction and initially k of them get goods.
Case 1: i is a winner initially.
If i wants to increase his utility by lying on copies, then c′i must satisfy
uici − pci < uici − p′c′i ⇒ ci p > c′i p′.
From Definition 3.1, we have
p = R
k∑
j=1, j 6=i
c′j + ci
p′ = R
k∑
j=1, j 6=i
c′j + c′i +
l∑
j=k+1
c′j
,
where l is the last winner when the unit price is p′.
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Then we can get
ci
R
k∑
j=1, j 6=i
c′j + ci
> c′i
R
k∑
j=1, j 6=i
c′j + c′i +
l∑
j=k+1
c′j
⇒ (ci − c′i )
(
k∑
j=1, j 6=i
c′j
)
+ ci
l∑
j=k+1
c′j > 0.
Since ci < c′i ,
∑k
j=1, j 6=i c′j ≥ 0, then
∑l
j=k+1 c′j > 0. So if a winner wants to increase his utility by cheating, his
cheating must let at least one loser become a winner.
Case 2: i is a loser initially.
Similarly, we have
uici − p′c′i > 0⇒ uici > p′c′i .
Since i is a loser, we have
R > ui
(
i−1∑
j=1
c′j + ci
)
.
From Definition 3.1,
p′ = R
i−1∑
j=1
c′j + c′i +
l∑
j=i+1
c′j
,
where l is the last winner when unit price is p′.
Then we get
R
i−1∑
j=1
c′j + ci
> ui ⇒ ci Ri−1∑
j=1
c′j + ci
> p′c′i
⇒ ci
i−1∑
j=1
c′j + ci
>
c′i
i−1∑
j=1
c′j + c′i +
l∑
j=i+1
c′j
⇒ (ci − c′i )
(
i−1∑
j=1
c′j
)
+ ci
l∑
j=i+1
c′j > 0.
So if a loser wants to increase his utility by cheating, his cheating must let at least one loser after him become a winner.
From the above analysis, we know that bidder i’s cheating must make at least one loser after him become a winner;
otherwise, his cheating has no positive effect on his utility. 
Assume C = {c′1, . . . , c′n} is the set of current copies of all bidders in the auction. For any equilibrium in the
equilibrium set, bidder i’s copy demand is denoted by c∗i . From Lemma 4.4, if all bidders become winners, no one
can benefit from increasing copy demand, so we can get the upper bound of submitted copies for a RevenueShareR
Auction: c∗i − ci ≤ Run −
∑n
j=1 c′j . Combined with Lemma 4.2, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 4.5. In a RevenueShareR Auction, the copy bounds is as follows:
ci ≤ c∗i ≤ ci +
R
un
−
n∑
j=1
c j .
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In RPRS, first we partition the bids into two bid sets. Assume the optimal revenue for the two bid sets is F ′ and
F ′′ respectively, and the revenue for all bids is F . Since F ′ ≤ F and F ′′ ≤ F , then we have the theorem:
Theorem 4.6. In an RPRS Auction, the copy bounds in a Nash equilibrium are
ci ≤ c∗i ≤
F
un
.
5. Revenue bounds of RPRS auction
In this section, we focus on the auctioneer’s revenue. Here we will prove that an RPRS Auction is an auctioneer-
advantaged auction with unconditional competitive ratio. We use the optimal single price auction as the benchmark
to compute the revenue bounds of an RPRS Auction.
Theorem 5.1. An RPRS Auction is an auctioneer-advantaged auction.
Proof. Assume b is a bidders’ true type vector and b∗ is any equilibrium satisfying Assumption 2.1 in the auction.
The optimal single price revenues in S′ and S′′ are denoted by F ′(b) and F ′′(b) respectively. From the above section,
we know that a rational bidder only has the motivation to lie on demanded copies. By Theorem 4.3, c∗i ≥ ci for any
bidder i . Thus, F ′(b∗) ≥ F ′(b) and F ′′(b∗) ≥ F ′′(b). Since the total revenue R∗ in the equilibrium is equal to
min{F ′(b∗),F ′′(b∗)}, then we have R∗ ≥ R.
Therefore, an RPRS Auction is an auctioneer-advantaged auction. 
The following definition and lemmas are prepared for computing the competitive ratio of an RPRS Auction.
Definition 5.2. Given any set S = {e1, . . . , en} where ei ∈ R+, partition S uniformly at random into two sets S1 and
S2 such that S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ and S1 ∪ S2 = S. Let
g(S) = E
[
min
{∑
i∈S1
ei ,
∑
i∈S2
ei
}]
,
which is the expectation of the minimum sum between subset S1 and S2.
Lemma 5.3. ∀i, j , if S′ = (S\{ei , e j }) ∪ {ei + e j }, g(S′) ≤ g(S).
Proof. Let d = ei + e j , then S′ = (S\{ei , e j }) ∪ {d}. Without loss of generality, suppose S′\{d} is partitioned
randomly into two subsets, whose sums are A and B respectively, and A ≤ B.
Now we fix the partitions and compare the expectation of the minimum sum between the situation where the
element d is thrown into any of the subsets based on an independent toss of a fair coin and the situation where the
elements ei , e j are thrown respectively into any of the subsets randomly.
1. If A + d ≤ B, min{A + d, B} = A + d and min{A, B + d} = A. So the expectation is (A + d)/2+ A/2.
For ei , e j , similarly, min{A + ei + e j , B} = A + ei + e j = A + d, min{A + ei , B + e j } = A + ei ,
min{A + e j , B + ei } = A + e j and min{A, B + ei + e j } = A. So the expectation is
(A + d)/4+ (A + ei )/4+ (A + e j )/4+ A/4 = (4A + 2d)/4
= (A + d)/2+ A/2.
For this case, g(S) = g(S′).
2. If A + d > B, min{A + d, B} = B and min{A, B + d} = A. So the expectation is (A + B)/2.
For ei , e j , without loss of generality, suppose ei ≤ e j
(a) If both A + ei < B and A + e j < B, min{A + ei + e j , B} = B, min{A + ei , B + e j } = A + ei ,
min{A + e j , B + ei } = A + e j and min{A, B + ei + e j } = A. So the expectation is
B/4+ (A + ei )/4+ (A + e j )/4+ A/4 = (B + A + d + 2A)/4
≥ (A + B)/2.
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(b) If A + ei ≥ B, min{A + ei + e j , B} = B, min{A + ei , B + e j } = A + ei , min{A + e j , B + ei } ≥ B and
min{A, B + ei + e j } = A. So the expectation is at least
B/4+ (A + ei )/4+ B/4+ A/4 = (2A + 2B + ei )/4
≥ (A + B)/2.
(c) If A + e j ≥ B, min{A + ei + e j , B} = B, min{A + ei , B + e j } = A + ei , min{A + e j , B + ei } ≥ B and
min{A, B + ei + e j } = A. So the expectation is larger than (A + B)/2.
Therefore, for the fixed partitions A and B, the expectation of the minimum sum when the element d is thrown into
any of the subsets randomly is smaller than that when the elements ei , e j are thrown into any of the subsets randomly.
Hence, ∀i, j , and S′ = (S\{ei , e j }) ∪ {ei + e j }, g(S) ≥ g(S′). 
Lemma 5.4. Given any set S = {e1, . . . , en} where ei ∈ R+ and |S| ≥ 2, g(S)/∑ j∈S e j ≥ (1 − α′)/4, where
α′ = maxi {ei/∑ j∈S e j }.
Proof. If |S| = 2, since α′ ≥ 1/2, then g(S)/∑ j∈S e j = (1− α′)/2 ≥ (1− α′)/4.
If |S| ≥ 3, obviously, we can find some ei ∈ S and two subsets S1 and S2 such that S1 ∩ S2 = ∅, S1 ∪ S2 = S,∑
j∈S1 e j ≤
∑
j∈S2 e j and
∑
j∈S1 e j ≥
∑
j∈S2 e j − ei . So
∑
j∈S1 e j ≥
∑
j∈S e j −
∑
j∈S1 e j − ei . Hence,∑
j∈S1
e j ≥
(∑
j∈S
e j − ei
)
/2∑
j∈S1
/∑
j∈S
e j ≥ (1− α′)/2
Now, let S′ =
{∑
j∈S1 e j ,
∑
j∈S2 e j
}
, from Lemma 5.3, g(S) ≥ g(S′). Since ∑ j∈S1 e j ≤ ∑ j∈S2 e j , g(S′)
= 12 ·
∑
j∈S1 e j . Therefore,
g(S)
/∑
j∈S
e j ≥ g(S′)
/∑
j∈S
e j =
∑
j∈S1
e j
2
∑
j∈S
e j
≥ (1− α′)/4. 
Theorem 5.5. A Random Partition with Revenue Share auction is 4/(1 − α) competitive against α defined in
Definition 2.6 if there are at least two winners.
Proof. Assume b is bidders’ true type vector and b∗ is any equilibrium in the auction. We first partition bids b
uniformly at random into two bid sets S′ and S′′. Corresponding to the partition of b, the set B is also divided into two
subsets B′ and B′′ , where B′ ⊆ S′, B′′ ⊆ S′′. The optimal single price revenues in S′ and S′′ are denoted by F ′(b)
and F ′′(b) respectively.
E
[
min
{F ′(b),F ′′(b)}]
F (2)(b) ≥
E
[
min
{
pF(b) ·
∑
i∈B′
ci , pF(b) ·
∑
i∈B′′
ci
}]
pF(b) ·
∑
i∈B
ci
(5.1)
=
E
[
min
{∑
i∈B′
ci ,
∑
i∈B′′
ci
}]
∑
i∈B
ci
. (5.2)
According to Lemma 5.4, if |B| ≥ 2, then Eq. (5.2)= g(B)/∑ j∈B c j ≥ (1−α)/4, where α = max{ci/∑ j∈B c j }.
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From Theorem 5.1, we have
E[RevenueRPRS(b∗)]
F (2)(b) ≥
E[RevenueRPRS(b)]
F (2)(b)
≥1− α
4
.
(5.3)
6. Limited supply with copy and budget constraints
The previous model only considers copy constraint. Since some bidders may have limited purchasing power, such
as in an ad-words auction, here we present another unconditional competitive auction for the model with copy and
budget constraints. Obviously, when the budget tends to be infinite, this model is the same as that with copy constraint
only. What is more, in this section we study limited supply instead of unlimited supply. In fact, unlimited supply is a
special case of limited supply. In the limited supply model, if the supply exceeds the bidders’ total demands, then it is
equivalent to the unlimited supply model. So here we are studying a more comprehensive model.
Definition 6.1. Given bids b = ((u1, c1, b1), . . . , (un, cn, bn)), where ui represents the unit value buyer i is willing
to pay for the commodity, ci represents the number of copies i demands and bi represents i’s budget. If b is sorted
in decreasing order according to the unit value, then Fm(b) represents the optimal single price revenue subject to the
constraint that there are at most m copies sold. That is,
Fm(b) = max
p∈R+
{
p ·min
{∑
ui≥p
min
{
ci ,
bi
p
}
,m
}}
. (6.1)
Definition 6.2. Given bids b = ((u1, c1, b1), . . . , (un, cn, bn)), R, and limited supply m, find the largest integer
k ∈ [1,m], such that∑
ui≥R/k
min
{
ci ,
bi
R/k
}
≥ k.
Let pR,m = Rk .
Auction 3 RevenueShareR,m Auction
1: Calculate pR,m .
2: Set r =∑ui≥pR,m min {ci , bipR,m }.
3: If r ≤ m, for any winner i such that ui ≥ pR,m , sell min
{
ci ,
bi
pR,m
}
copies to i at unit price pR,m .
If r > m, sell m units from r units randomly to the winners at unit price pR,m under the constraint that any winner
i should get at most min
{
ci ,
bi
pR,m
}
copies.
4: Other bidders lose.
Obviously, a RevenueShareR,m Auction sells no more than m units.
Lemma 6.3. Bidders will tell the truth on unit value and budget in a RevenueShareR,m Auction.
Proof. In the proof, we use p instead of pR,m for simplicity. Firstly, we will show that a bidder will not lie on the unit
value.
For a bidder j , if u j ≥ p, he has certain probability to get goods at unit price p, thus his utility ≥ 0. Now suppose
he lies on the unit value from u j to u′j . If u′j ≥ p, his utility does not change. And if u′j < p, he must be a loser and
his utility becomes 0. So he will not lie on the unit value.
For a bidder j , if u j < p, he is a loser and thus his utility is zero. Now if u′j < p, his utility does not change. And
if u′j ≥ p, his utility will be at most zero.
Secondly, we will show that a bidder will not lie on budget.
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It is obvious that a bidder j will never submit b′j > b j , otherwise his utility will become negative infinity. Thus,
we only need to consider b′j < b j . And the utility will not be influenced if u j < p. So we only need to consider the
case that u j ≥ p. In the proof, k is the parameter defined in Definition 6.2 and bidder j ′s cheating turns k into k′.
According to Definition 6.2, here k ≥ k′. Since bidder j will not lie on unit value, suppose he bids (u j , c′j , b j ).
Case 1: k = k′. Then p′ = p. If k < m, then r < m. So the bidder j will not benefit from cheating. If k = m, then
r ≥ m. Assume min
{
c′j ,
b j
p
}
= C j , min
{
c′j ,
b′j
p′
}
= C j ′ and C j −C j ′ = δ (δ ≥ 0). For the bidder j , he can get mr C j
units of goods originally. And if he cheats, he will get mr−δ (C j − δ) units of goods. However, mr−δ (C j − δ) ≤ mr C j ;
thus, he will not tell lies.
Case 2: k > k′. Then p′ > p. If u j < p′, the bidder j will lose. Obviously, if r ≤ m, the bidder will not cheat.
Now assume u j ≥ p′. For bidder j , if his cheating makes the unit price change, then δ ≥ r − m + 1 and thus
C j
′ ≤ C j − (r −m + 1). If he tells the truth, he can get mr C j units of goods. Since mr C j > C j − (r −m + 1) > C j ′,
he will not lie.
Therefore, bidder i will always tell the truth on unit value and budget. 
Based on Auction 3, we get the following auction.
Auction 4 Random Partition with Revenue Share(m) Auction (RPRS(m))
1: Partition bids b uniformly at random into two bid sets S′ and S′′.
2: Compute F ′ = Fm(S′) and F ′′ = Fm(S′′).
3: Run RevenueShareF ′,m on S′′. If there are no winners, run RevenueShareF ′′,m on S′ respectively.
Similarly, we get the following two theorems:
Theorem 6.4. In an RPRS(m) Auction, bidders always tell their true types of unit value and budget.
Theorem 6.5. An RPRS(m) Auction is an auctioneer-advantaged auction.
In this more comprehensive model, we can still get the competitive ratio 4/(1 − α); however, the proof in the
previous section can not apply to this model.
Theorem 6.6. RPRS(m) is 4/(1− α) competitive against α if there are at least two bidders that win.
Proof. Assume b is bidders’ true type and b∗ is any equilibrium in the auction. We first partition bids b uniformly at
random into two bid sets S′ and S′′. Corresponding to the partition of b, the set B is also divided into two subsets B′
and B′′, where B′ ⊆ S′, B′′ ⊆ S′′. Let F ′ = Fm(S′),F ′′ = Fm(S′′).
Now we only consider F ′.
Case 1: pF (2)m
∑
i∈B′ Ci ≥ F (2)m .
If
∑
i∈B′ Ci ≤ m, F ′ ≥ pF (2)m
∑
i∈B′ Ci ≥ F (2)m .
If
∑
i∈B′ Ci > m, since pF (2)m ≥
F (2)m
m , F ′ ≥ pF (2)m m ≥ F
(2)
m .
Case 2: pF (2)m
∑
i∈B′ Ci < F (2)m .
Then,
∑
i∈B′ Ci <
F (2)m
pF(2)m
< m, since pF (2)m ≥
F (2)m
m . So F ′ ≥ pF (2)m
∑
i∈B′ Ci .
Therefore, F ′ ≥ min
{
F (2)m , pF (2)m
∑
i∈B′ Ci
}
.
Similarly, F ′′ ≥ min
{
F (2)m , pF (2)m
∑
i∈B′′ Ci
}
.
E[RevenueRPRS(m)(b)]
F (2)m (b)
≥E
[
min{F ′,F ′′}]
F (2)m (b)
. (6.2)
If min{F ′,F ′′} = F (2)m , the competitive ratio is 1.
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If min{F ′,F ′′} 6= F (2)m , Eq. (6.2) becomes the same as Eq. (5.3). So the competitive ratio is 4/(1− α), which is at
least 4 (> 1).
From Theorem 6.5, we have:
E[RevenueRPRS(m)(b∗)]
F (2)m (b)
≥E[RevenueRPRS(m)(b)]
F (2)m (b)
. (6.3)
Therefore, the unconditional competitive ratio of RPRS(m) is 4/(1− α) competitive against α if there are at least two
bidders win. 
7. Conclusion and discussions
This paper investigates multi-unit auctions with copy and budget constraints. It is worth noting that this extension
from auctions without copy constraint to auctions with both copy and budget constraints is not trivial. Firstly, the
bidder’s copy constraint is independent of the unit price. However, the copy this bidder can afford is dependent on not
only the budget, but also the unit price. The difference could be found from the Definitions 3.1 and 6.2. So computing
the unit price in the model with both copy and budget constraints is more complicated than computing the unit price
in the model with only copy constraint. Secondly and the most importantly, in the first model the supply is unlimited
while in the second model it is limited, which makes the technologies in the first model unable to be adapted to the
second model. We have to design a new mechanism for the second model.
In the paper, we introduce a new kind of mechanism called auctioneer-advantaged mechanisms, where each agent’s
self-interest motivated strategy brings better utility not only to himself, but also to the auctioneer. The following facts
make the implementation of auctioneer-advantaged mechanisms possible.
1. Every item has zero cost to the auctioneer.
2. The bidders will never lie on their unit values and budgets, but may tell a larger number of copies than their true
copy demands.
3. In unlimited supply, we have extra items allocated to more bidders. In limited supply, the items still may not totally
allocated in an RPRS(m) Auction.
Actually, in the auctions proposed in the paper, although a bidder’s self-interested bidding behavior not only benefit
the other bidders in the same partition as him but also the auctioneer, the bidder’s self-interested bidding behavior may
hurt the bidders in the other partition by making them become the losers.
It is worthy of emphasis that our novel auctioneer-advantaged mechanisms shed light on the following scenario.
Sometimes, in order to maximize the revenue, the optimal auction has to be executed inefficiently. That is, the optimal
solution of underlying allocation and payment will have to be found in exponential time. When that happens, we can
relax the auction as long as bidders’ strategic behaviors must also lead to larger total revenue to the auctioneer. In
other words, the auction makes use of the bidders’ computational power to increase the auctioneer’s revenue. This
idea also has emerged in the mechanism design in [14].
Coincidentally, new kinds of mechanism called output truthful mechanisms have been raised these days in [4,10].
In output truthful mechanisms, what concerns us is whether the output under the equilibria in the mechanisms is the
same as the result under the truthful input, while our auctioneer-advantaged mechanisms are concerned about whether
the revenue under the equilibria in the mechanism is higher than the revenue under the truthful input. Ultimately, the
motivation of both mechanisms is to improve otherwise weak performances by relaxing the constraint of dominant
strategy.
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